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It’s increasingly common to claim that logic isn’t special, that a logical theory is just a
theory like any other (Hjortland 2017; Priest 2014; Russell 2014; Williamson 2017)These
anti-exceptionalist views use theoretical virtues of alternative logics—simplicity, strength,
etc.—in order to evaluate them analogously to how we evaluate scientific theories.1 In
doing so, it’s helpful to know when two seemingly distinct theories are really differently
formulated versions of the same theory, saying the same things in different ways. In other
words, it’s helpful to have an account of theoretical equivalence between logics.
For example, axiomatic and natural deduction presentations of classical propositional
logic initially look quite different even though they’re intuitively theoretically equivalent.
Now, natural deduction is less metatheoretically tractable while axiomatic accounts
do worse at revealing obvious entailments. Neither disadvantage is problematic once
we’re justified in treating them as theoretically equivalent; perceived disadvantages
of a logical theory that are merely presentational can be ignored in calculating its
overall virtues.
We have options when developing a notion of theoretical equivalence. One standard
way uses semantic properties, like having the same set ofmodels, to account for when two
logical theories are equivalent. However, as the required model theory can only be devel-
oped by appealing to significant logical resources, many of which are in contention when
choosing between logics, it’s natural for anti-exceptionalists to prefer less theoretically
taxing syntactic accounts of theoretical equivalence. Syntactic accounts require lighter
metatheoretic resources (roughly a basic theory of syntax) which can often be developed
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in a neutral fashion with resources shared between a pair of logical theories.2 Even if
we can sometimes use a semantic notion of theoretical equivalence, it’s useful to have a
syntactic notion available for cases where the resources necessary to develop the semantic
notion are in contention.
However, in a recent paper, John Wigglesworth argues that syntactic accounts of
theoretical equivalence are simply too coarse-grained to explicate any reasonable notion
of theoretical equivalence between logics. This because even the best syntactic accounts
treat classical and intuitionistic logic as theoretically equivalent. Yet no two logical
theories could be more obviously distinct than these (Wigglesworth 2017). His argument
works against some syntactic accounts, but it doesn’t work against them all. I’ll show
here how to avoid his objection by developing a more adequate and, importantly, more
discriminating syntactic account of theoretical equivalence.3
A standard syntactic account of theoretical equivalence in the philosophy of science
uses intertranslatability between theories—mappings between sets of sentences closed
under classical logic—as the mark of theoretical equivalence.This doesn’t work for com-
paring various logics. For one reason, we can’t presume a uniform notion of closure. For
another, logics centrally include claims about how different claims—including various
hypothetical claims—about the world relate to one another. Whether one thinks about
this enterprise as worldly or not, this requires us to modify the standard account of syn-
tactic equivalence.4 We need tomodify the standard account of theoretical equivalence so
that it captures equivalence between two logical theories instead of between two scientific
theories.
The first thing to do is to generalize beyond particular closed theories to logics. We
treat logics as sets of axioms and rules. For a sequent calculus and (some) presentations
of natural deduction, this will include structural rules like identity, weakening, and cut as
well as operational rules governing connectives likemodus ponens. For axiomatic systems
and (some) presentations of natural deduction, this will include axioms and operational
rules. Since our concern is syntactic theories, we’ll use derivability—repeated application
of rules—as our closure condition, saying that ψ is in the closure of a set of sentences
S in a logic L (writing this closure as LS) just in case ψ can be obtained by repeated
application of the rules characterizing L to sentences in S and the sentences we obtain
by such application.5
For Wigglesworth, two logical theories L and L* are intertranslatable when, for every
set of sentences S, there are mappings a1: LS→ L*S and a2: L*S→ LS, where these
mappings commute with negation6 (i.e., where a1(¬ψ)=¬a1(ψ) and analogously for
a2.) This generalized intertranslatability account looks initially plausible for explicating
theoretical equivalence between logics.7
AsWigglesworth demonstrates, though, it faces extensional problems. In light of these,
he claims that we should give a semantic characterization of theoretical equivalence
instead of a syntactic one. This might be right if the generalization just mooted was the
best syntactic account of theoretical equivalence, but it isn’t.We can avoidWigglesworth’s
conclusion by refining the intertranslatability account of theoretical equivalence in
three ways: the first involves ensuring a common language, the second generalizing the
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translations, and the third involves demanding that the translations preserve meaning,
insofar as that can be done in a syntactic setting.8
These refinements, though they result in a more stringent notion of theoretical equiv-
alence, are natural, philosophically motivated, and do not undermine the light-touch
syntactic approach anti-exceptionalist should favor. Motivating these refinements
involves discussing some important issues about theoretical equivalence between log-
ics, so the ensuing discussion is important generally, not just as a way of avoiding an
objection to a particular approach to theoretical equivalence between logics.
Reﬁnement 1: Ensuring common languages
The problems with Wigglesworth’s target syntactic account start when the languages of
the logics evaluated are either disjoint or overlapping. For example, p v¬p occurs nowhere
in the pure theory of conjunction (&) and negation (¬). Supposewe compared this theory
with the pure theory of disjunction (v) and negation. By the syntactic account given
above, we’d need to compare the closure of every set of sentences involving v and ¬ under
both the pure theory of disjunction and negation and the pure theory of conjunction and
negation. But since the latter doesn’t contain any rules for disjunction, presumably {p v
¬p} has a nigh-trivial closure in the latter theory.
For a more worrisome example, let B be the pure theory of conjunction, disjunction,
and negation and B* the intuitive notational variant which treats v as conjunction
and & as disjunction (modifying the corresponding rules in the obvious way). Now
consider the effects of closing a tautology (in B) under B and B*. B{p v ¬p} contains all
and only the classical tautologies in &, v, and ¬; B*{p v ¬p} contains all sentences since
we can derive both p and ¬p using “conjunction” elimination and then apply reductio
ad absurdum. B and B* thus aren’t intertranslatable in Wigglesworth’s sense. But they’re
intuitively notational variants and hence theoretically equivalent; so the lack of a shared
language—in particular, a shared set of logical constants (and formation rules)—causes
serious problems.9
The trouble, obviously, is that we can’t assume a shared language with which
to populate S. But the whole idea was to test the effect of each logic on arbitrary
bits of common content (i.e. on various S). There are two obvious solutions for this
problem. First, we could treat intertranslatability as relative to an existing pair of
mappings between the logical expressions of one language and the logical expres-
sions of another (presuming for simplicity that the non-logical expressions are
common.10) This allows us to formulate S in a neutral fashion, at least relative to
our presumed mappings between logical expressions. We then say L and L* are
theoretically equivalent, relative to a pair of mappings t,u, just in case there are map-
pings f and g where for every set of sentences S in the language of L, f : LS→ L*t(S)
and every S in the language of L*, g: L*S→ Lu(S) (where these mappings commute
with negation).
Second, we could apply our main translations to S as well, modifying our account
accordingly. We’d then say that L and L* are theoretically equivalent just in case there
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are mappings f and g between L and L* where for every set of sentences S in the language
of L, f : LS→ L*f (S) and every S in the language of L*, g: L*S→ Lg(S).
Either way, the key move is ensuring some type of common content for S so that the
perhaps differential effects of closing S under each logic can be evaluated. Accordingly,
we apply these mappings only to S, leaving untouched the role of each logic in closing the
resulting sets of sentences under derivability. We require of translations between these
results that they preserve the condition of commutingwith negation so as to avoid entirely
perverse pairs of translations and presumed mappings.
Each solution yields non-trivial notions of theoretical equivalence, but I prefer the
first. To see why, note that B* can be viewed two ways: as a notational variant of B or as
the radical view permitting inferring disjuncts from disjunctions. The second solution
doesn’t distinguish these interpretations since there aremappings f and g between B and
B* such that for every S in B, f : BS→B*f (S) and every S in B*, g: B*S→Bg(S). So they’re
theoretically equivalent by the second solution, nomatter what we intendedB* to be.This
is too coarse-grained; these distinct understandings of B* should be distinguished.
The first solution distinguishes them. Let t map each connective in B to itself; let t*
swap& and v. The closure of S under B* then depends on whether we’re relativizing our
notion of theoretical equivalence to t or t* (note that we haven’t modified these rules at
all).11 For example, consider the rule of “disjunction” elimination. As t* translates p & ¬p
as p v ¬p, disjunction elimination in B*—“to infer ψ from ψ v φ”—is just a notational
variant of conjunction elimination presuming t*. Presuming t instead, “disjunction”
elimination permits inferring “disjuncts” from “disjunctions” in one of the two theories.12
So, for our first refinement, given mappings t,u between the logical expressions of B
and B*, let’s require of theoretically equivalent logics B and B* that there are mappings f,
g such that for every set of sentence S in the language of B, f : BS→B*t(S) and for every
set S in the language of B* g: B*S→B*u(S). where f,g,t, and u commute with negation in
the sense that f (¬ψ)= t(¬)f (ψ) and g(¬ψ)= u(¬)g(ψ).13 A little work shows that B and
B* aren’t theoretically equivalent when we presume t. Even less work shows that they are
when we swap t* for t.
Since I prefer finer-grained approaches, I work with the first solution, treating theoret-
ical equivalence as theoretical equivalence relative to mappings of the logical expressions
in one language to the logical expressions of another.14 In light of our target case below,
we’ll assume below that t and u are both the identity mapping unless otherwise specified.
Reﬁnement 2: Generalizing the translations
The second refinement involves the generality of f and g. Again, the usual treatment of
theories as logically closed sets of sentences doesn’t naturally apply to logic itself since
logics centrally include claims about how claims about the world relate to each other.
Wigglesworth accounts for this by treating two logics as theoretically equivalent when
we have translations between the results of closing any set of sentences S, under both
logics, into one another. Intuitively, S then plays the role of a set of premises and LS the
set of its consequences.15
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This definition, though, permits using different translations for each S. These local
translations might use special features of the content of S, instead of what each logic says
about S, in translating between logics. For example, letD containψ v ¬ψ for every atomic
formula ψ in our language. D, understood intuitionistically, is an extremely strong set of
premises. It amounts to the decidability of all atomic formulas. Understood classically, D
is trivial (since classical logic presumes that all formulas are “determinate”.) So intuitively
they “say” quite different things. However, since the classical and intuitionistic closures
of D are the same, we can use the identity map to translate between the intuitionistic
and classical closures of S, even though it isn’t generally adequate to translate between
intuitionistic and classical logic. It’s only because of the presence of excluded middle for
all atomic formulas in D that the identity translation suffices.
Permissive accounts of translation likeWigglesworth’s do reasonably well at capturing
when two logically closed sets of sentences say the same thing, but badly at capturing
when two logical theories generally “say” the same thing. This last, though, is what
theoretical equivalence between logics should capture. We can capture this by using
general translations: mappings a1, a2 such that for every set of sentences S (in each
language respectively), a1: LS→ L*S and a2: L*S→ LS.16 We turn now to Wigglesworth’s
particular counterexample to syntactic accounts as a warm-up to our third and most
important refinement.
Wigglesworth’s counterexample
Wigglesworth’s example exploits standard translations of classical logic (C) into intuition-
istic logic (I) (due to Glivenko, Gödel, Gentzen, and others) where, for an eponymously
labeled translation g and derivability relations ⊢C and ⊢I:
1: ⊢C ψ↔ g(ψ).
2: ⊢I g(ψ)↔ ¬ ¬ g(ψ).
3: ⊢C ψ only if ⊢I g(ψ)
For concreteness, we’ll take as our g the mapping which takes p to ¬¬p, (p v q) to
¬(¬g(p)& ¬g(q)), ¬p to ¬g(p), and p→ q to g(p)→ g(q). It’s an easy exercise to show that
g commutes with negation, so it’s a general translation of classical logic into intuitionistic
logic. As for the other direction, since (pure) intuitionistic (propositional) logic is a
sublogic of classical, we can use the identity map as our translation. As g and the identity
map translate, in the above sense, between the results of closing any set of sentences
under intuitionistic and classical logic, Wigglesworth’s explication of syntactic accounts
of theoretical equivalence treats intuitionistic and classical logic as equivalent. But they’re
not. So it’s inadequate.
Should we conclude that syntactic explications of theoretical equivalence between
logics are inadequate in general? This would be premature. To criticize all syntactic
accounts this way, we’d need to show that Wigglesworth’s is the best syntactic account
of theoretical equivalence. But it’s not; there’s a further natural refinement which solves
Wigglesworth’s problem and results in a more satisfying overall account of theoretical
equivalence. The key idea is requiring that two theoretically equivalent theories don’t
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“say” quite different things. Even syntactic accounts of intertranslatability should aim to
preserve content between translations. To make good on this requirement, of course, we
need a syntactic criterionwhich plausibly captures when two logical theories say the same
things. Happily, there is one.
Reﬁnement 3: Avoiding perverse “translations”
When we close a set of sentences S and its logical-expression-mapping image t(S) under
L and L*, two theoretically equivalent logics, we want the results of translating the
L*-closure of t(S) into L to be, in an intuitive sense, L-equivalent to the L-closure of
S (analogously for translating Lu(S) into L*S). Otherwise, assuming L and L* really are
theoretically equivalent, our translation from L*t(S) into LS has perverted S’s content
(relative to the mapping t); we’ve gained or lost information in passing back and forth
between the two logics. It’s then only a translation in the recherché sense of a minimally
adequate embedding of L*t(S) into LS, not a translation in the fuller sense which would
legitimate using intertranslatablity as an explication of two logics saying the same thing.
Consider an analogy. Supposewe’vewhat purports to be anEnglish translation of Saat-
leri Ayarlama Enstitüsü. Suppose further we’ve a mapping between English and Turkish
such that, for every sentence in The Time Regulation Institute, there’s a corresponding
sentence in Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü. Does this guarantee that everything said in Saat-
leri Ayarlama Enstitüsü is said in The Time Regulation Institute? No, obviously not. For
example, our mapping might send two subtly different ways of apologizing in Turkish,
“Üzgünüm” and “Özür dilerim,” to “I am sorry”. This would be a perverted translation
(though we often can’t do much better in practice.)
For a truly adequate translation, we need that for every sentence in Saatleri Ayarlama
Enstitüsü, there’s a Turkish-equivalent sentence in the set of Turkish sentences obtained
by applying our mapping to The Time Regulation Institute. If there isn’t, then our
translation has perverted the meaning of the Turkish original and, corresponding, the
content of the two novels aren’t the same. As we want our account of theoretical
equivalence between logics to capture when their content is the same, we should demand
that the translations between them aren’t perverse.
Translations between classical and intuitionistic logic fails this constraint; g, for
instance, effectively takes p v ¬p to ¬(¬p & ¬¬p), but while we can derive ¬(¬p & ¬¬p)
from p v ¬p intuitionistically, we cannot so derive p v ¬p from ¬(¬p & ¬¬p)—that is,
they’re not intuitionistically equivalent. From an intuitionistic point of view, g is perverse
(presuming reasonable mappings between logical expressions).
Let S= {p v ¬p}. IS then contains all the classical tautologies involving p. p v ¬p,
intuitionistically, is tantamount to the claim that p is decidable and thus that classical
reasoning can be used concerning it. g purges every classical tautology in CS by replacing
it with an intuitionistic tautology in g(CS); no solely classical tautologies remain. In
particular, g(CS) intuitively says nothing about decidability. So IS and g(CS) say quite
different things, witnessed by the lack of intuitionistic equivalence between them. g is
perverse.
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I propose to lay lack of perversion down as a further constraint on theoretical equiv-
alence. So two logics L, L* are theoretically equivalent, relative to presumed mappings
t,u, if there are general translations aL: LG→ L*t(G) and aL*: L*G→Lu(G) where, given any
set of sentences S in the language of L, LS is L-equivalent to aL*(L*t(S)) and similarly for
aL* . What is it to be L-equivalent in this context? It’s to be such that for every sentence
ψ in LS there’s a sentence φ in aL*(L*t(G)) such that L{φ} = L{ψ}. Likewise for L*.17 Essen-
tially, we’re using the notion of logical closure to guarantee that the results of translation
of the classical theory of G into an intuitionistic theory is intuitionistically equivalent to
the intuitionistic theory of G.
We can call this constraint Anti-Perversion: any pair of logics L and L* that further
satisfy this condition will be such that by each of their lights, the L and L* closure of any
set of sentences (relative to the mapping between logical constants) will be the same, up
to interderivability.18 This means that any two theoretically equivalent logics L, L* will
be such that any theory formulated in L has an L-equivalent theory formulated in L* and
vice versa. This is a comforting result; it shows that two logics theoretically equivalent in
our refined sense really do say the same thing about various bits of content.
Upshot
As just pointed out, Wigglesworth’s translations are perverse and, in fact, there is no
unperverted pair of general translations aI : IG→CG and aC: CG→ IG.
pf . Presume the identity mapping t between logical constants of C and I. Any general
translation aC needs to send the sentence p v ¬p, which is a member of CA for any set
A, to something intuitionistically weaker since C{} contains p v ¬p and I{} contains
nothing as intuitionistically strong. This holds for all sentences intuitionistically
equivalent to p v ¬p. Now let G be {p v ¬p}. Since C{} =C{p v ¬p} our general
translation of CG, aC(CG) contains only things intuitionistically weaker than p v ¬p.
So there will be no sentence φ in aC(CG) such that I{φ} = I{p v ¬p}.
Note this reasoning works mutatis mutandis against the first way out described in
our first refinement or, analogously, when using g as our t as well as using it as our
translation: g takes p v ¬p effectively to ¬(¬p & ¬¬p) and, of course, C{} =C{¬(¬p & ¬¬p)}.
So, again, aC(Cg(G)) doesn’t contain any sentence φ such that I{φ} = I{p v ¬p}. We can also
rule out unperverted nice translations using a result of Wojcicki (exploited for similar
purposes by French (2017) and Humberstone 2000). ‘Nice’ here means that atomic
nonlogical content ismapped to itself, that all logical expressions commute (relative to the
presumedmapping), and that the translations are inverse to each other.19 Anti-Perversion
is thus robust enough to exclude Wigglesworth-type examples across a range of different
refinements.
Nevertheless, there are intuitively equivalent pairs of logics which satisfy
Anti-Perversion; consider B and B* under the t* mapping described above. For any
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sentence in the translation of B*t*({p v ¬p}) (= B*{p & ¬p}) back into B, there will be a sen-
tence in B{p v ¬p} which is B-equivalent to it. And conversely. Consider also our opening
example of natural deduction and axiomatic presentations of classical logic.
For a more involved and interesting example, we can use the De Morgan
equivalences—for both our connective mapping and our general translation—in order
to translate the conjunction negation fragment of classical logic into the disjunction
negation fragment and conversely while satisfying Anti-Perversion.
Finally, note that we can take a range of interesting nonclassical logics, such as
intuitionistic or relevance logic, and show that adding additional axioms yields theoretical
equivalence with classical logic. For instance, intuitionistic logic with the addition of A v
¬A, as an axiom, for every piece of non-logical content A is theoretically equivalent, in
our sense, to classical logic. As is the addition of ¬¬A→A for every piece of non-logical
content A. And, of course, they’re theoretically equivalent to each other.20
So there is a useful, interesting, and non-trivial syntactic notion of theoretical equiva-
lence, captured by adding Anti-Perversion to general intertranslatability (relativizing the
whole to a mapping between the logical expressions so as to guarantee that our sets of
sentences can be formulated in a “neutral” language) which distinguishes clearly theo-
retically inequivalent logics like classical and intuitionistic logic while not distinguish-
ing clearly theoretically equivalent logics like the disjunction negation and conjunction
negation fragments of classical logic. It might not be a perfect notion of theoretical
equivalence—there are well-known bizarre results to using syntactic notions like this
to capture theoretical equivalence21—but there simply may be no perfect explication of
our intuitive ideas about sameness of content. The notion I’ve articulated serves in many
cases to do the work a notion of theoretical equivalence should do in comparing a pair of
logics in an antiexceptionalist framework.
Correspondingly, none of this shows that Wigglesworth’s suggested notion of theoret-
ical equivalence for logical theories, in terms of categorical equivalence, isn’t a useful and
interesting one.22 But I’ve shown that not all syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence
are hopeless in explicating the some form of theoretical equivalence between various log-
ical alternatives.
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Notes
1 See Woods (2017b) for other worries about anti-exceptionalist methodology.
2 See Woods (2017a, 2017b), and Meadows and Weber (2016) for discussion of these issues.
3 I’ll stick with propositional logic as the problems I’m concerned with are already present there
and quantificational theory poses additional difficulties.
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4 A referee (not the one thanked elsewhere in this paper) suggests this is
anti-anti-exceptionalist. Not so; it’s rather the standard rejection of treating a logic-as a
merely set of theorems. No one seriously conceives of a logic as a set of theorems
anymore—since, for instance, some non-equivalent logics don’t have any—so this point
seems utterly uncontroversial, even given anti-exceptionalism.
5 Treating axioms as a zero-case of applying rules. This general notion of derivability is clear
enough for our purposes (and can, of course, be spelled out precisely in the usual ways.)
Thanks to a helpful referee for encouraging more generality here.
6 This constraint is a weakening of the typical requirement that translations commute with
logical operations, which isn’t obviously reasonable when comparing distinct logics.
Adopting the weakened constraint doesn’t eliminate all problems (Feferman 2000: A.4); for
an immediately pressing one, note that not all logics contain primitive negation operators! We
avoid this problem by means of the generalizable commutation condition mooted in the first
refinement. See also endnote 13.
7 Of course, there’s a wealth of material on translations between consequence relations which
could also be exploited in this regard. I’ll stick with developing Wigglesworth’s account, but
interested readers are encouraged to consult Wojcicki (1988) and references within.
8 French (2017) develops an account of “notational variance”—a slightly stronger notion of
equivalence—requiring that an equivalent logics stay equivalent under uniform increases in
background logical strength. This is an interesting additional condition to impose, but it’s
perhaps too stringent for theoretical equivalence. I hope to discuss this elsewhere.
9 I focus on correspondence between logical constants; the corresponding correspondence of
formation rules is obvious.
10 We could also drop this assumption and relativize our translations to an existing pair of
mappings between the languages in general; we ignore this complication by presuming a
shared field of non-logical content.
11 We could narrow down which mapping to presume, drawing on something like the
counterpart-theoretic story in Warren (2015a, §. 4) or that the resulting translations be nice in
the sense spelled out below. Alternatively, we could let presumed mappings vary with our
background purpose; after all, in practice some such mapping between logical expressions,
often the identity mapping, will be implicitly presumed. ‘Absolutized’ versions, such as the
notion of theoretical equivalence given by existentially or universally quantifying out the
relativity of our preferred notion, are either extremely weak or strong, as our example of B and
B* shows. I hope to take up these matters elsewhere.Thanks to a helpful referee for discussion.
12 This solution, being syntactic, doesn’t single out the bizarre theory; it just shows that there are
validities in one theory which are countervalidities in the other. But that’s all that’s needed to
carve the two apart. So even though there’s a semantic-ish presumption of common content
for S underlying our choice of a presumed mapping, our definition itself is still fully syntactic.
This is good news for the anti-exceptionalist.
13 We could also require our presumed mapping between logical expressions be nice in the sense
of preserving non-logical content and guaranteeing commutation for all logical expressions
for a naturally more stringent notion of theoretical equivalence. See below.
14 Translations between sets of logical expressions can be complex; we might map p v q to ¬(¬p
& ¬q). Details would distract and aren’t important here. What I say below is adaptable to the
second solution; those who favor the coarse-grained are invited to read the discussion
accordingly.
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15 Again, I follow Wigglesworth’s closure-based presentation throughout though we could
reframe the discussion using the relevant derivability relation without any loss.
16 Wigglesworth’s favored translation between classical and intuitionistic logic is general in this
sense. Remember that we’re suppressing the presumed mappings between logical expressions
unless it matters.
17 This baroque formulation avoids explicitly appealing to entailment. Wigglesworth reasonably
complains about such appeals by Glymour-style accounts of theoretical equivalence in terms
of definitional extensions (see Barrett and Halvorson 2016; Glymour 2013; McSweeney 2016).
We avoid Wigglesworth’s objection by using the same technology he accepts in developing
toy syntactic accounts of theoretical equivalence for criticism.
18 See Segerberg (1982: 43) for an analogous constraint on syntactic equivalence. As French
(2017) notes, Segerberg’s formulation of this condition doesn’t presume any kind of
compositionality (as I do in refinement 1 above), resulting in a weaker notion of equivalence.
Anti-Perversion also resembles a constraint discussed by Barrett and Halvorson (2016:
Definition 5). It differs by requiring that the equivalence between a sentence of intuitionistic
logic and the translated version of the corresponding sentence in classical logic hold without
any side-premises instead being provable “locally” from each IS (as well as avoiding the use of
the biconditional since our respective logics might not contain biconditionals, let alone
biconditionals that mean the same thing.) This is appropriate to the setting of general
translations, as discussed above, and in light of the application to logic itself instead of
nonlogical theories. Note that p v ¬p↔ ¬(¬p & ¬¬p) is in I{p v ¬p}. So the Barrett and
Halvorson refinement is insufficient to avoid Wigglesworth’s examples, even though it and
Anti-Perversion are similarly inspired.
19 Roughly, Wojcicki shows that ¬p would have to be translated, by a nice translation, into one
of six inequivalent formulas in a supra-intuitionistic logic. Since we can derive q from p, ¬p
classically, we need to be able to derive the translation of q from p and the translation of ¬p in
that logic. But none of the six potential translations will do. See op. cit. for details.
20 See Woods (2017b) for details of this strategy in bolstering the strength of nonclassical logics.
21 See Niebergall (2000) and French (2017) for discussion. See also Warren (2015b: objection 4)
for discussion of loosening the constraints on interpretation and problems lurking
thereabouts.
22 Although I worry about the background metatheory for reasons similar to those I’ve explored
in Woods (2017a).
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